Cramer v.Tyars: An Anomaly in California Civil Commitment Case Law by Tecimer, Dina
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
12-1-1980
Cramer v.Tyars: An Anomaly in California Civil
Commitment Case Law
Dina Tecimer
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dina Tecimer, Cramer v.Tyars: An Anomaly in California Civil Commitment Case Law, 14 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 165 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol14/iss1/6
CRAMER V. TYARS: AN ANOMALY IN CALIFORNIA
CIVIL COMMITMENT CASE LAW
In Cramer v. Tyars,I the California Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding may be com-
pelled to serve as a witness at his own commitment hearing.2 Although
the court held that the defendant should have been allowed to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to those disclosures
that could have exposed him to criminal prosecution, he could not re-
fuse to give testimony relevant to determining his dangerousness or his
mental condition.3 The court reasoned that the entire range of proce-
dural safeguards available to criminal defendants were not necessary
because of the civil nature of the proceeding.
4
A finding of mental retardation and dangerousness, however, re-
sults in incarceration (albeit hospitalization) in the same manner that a
guilty verdict does in a criminal proceeding. In both proceedings, the
critical effect is loss of liberty. Therefore, by holding that a person sub-
ject to an involuntary commitment proceeding has only qualified fifth
amendment rights rather than the absolute rights afforded to defend-
ants in criminal trials, the California Supreme Court effectively re-
quired that Tyars incriminate himself. Regardless of the content, the
testimony elicited can establish an element required by the state's com-
mitment statute in a manner analogous to proof of the requisite ele-
ments of a criminal act leading to confinement.
As this note demonstrates, the rationale of the California Supreme
Court represents a break from federal and state case law, both of which
have gradually expanded the scope of constitutional privileges afforded
to persons who are subjects of involuntary commitment hearings.5 Al-
though the majority in Tyars found that the trial court erred in denying
the privilege against self-incrimination,6 they concluded that the trial
court's error was harmless beyond all reasonable doubt due to the over-
whelming evidence of the subject's mental retardation. This note dis-
cusses why the trial court's error should not have been deemed
harmless in Tyars and demonstrates that the overwhelming evidence
1. 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979).
2. The masculine gender includes the feminine gender throughout this article.
3. 23 Cal. 3d at 138, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
4. Id at 137, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
5. See notes 21-44 infra and accompanying text.
6. 23 Cal. 3d at 138, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
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standard was inappropriately applied. This note also presents alterna-
tive modes of analysis which the Tyars court could have used more
successfully in dealing with each issue in Tyars. Finally, the detrimen-.
tal effects of the majority opinion are reviewed against the background
of subsequent decisions, which suggest that Tyars should be considered
an anomaly in California civil commitment case law.
I. FACTS
In 1976, the district attorney of San Bernardino County filed a pe-
tition for the commitment of Luther Tyars pursuant to sections 6500
and 6502 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.7 The peti-
tion alleged that Tyars was mentally retarded and a danger to himself
and others.8 At the hearing, evidencd presented by the prosecution es-
tablished that Tyars was unable to attend to his basic hygiene, that he
suffered from assaultive seizures, and that since 1971 he had resided at
Patton State Hospital because he had repeatedly attacked his family
when at home. Tyars' testimony, taken over the objection of his coun-
sel, was included in the evidence presented by the prosecution. Be-
cause of his speech impediment, a hospital attendant was allowed to
"interpret" Tyars' testimony.9 When the judge asked Tyars whether he
had been involved in any fights, Tyars testified to several assaultive
acts, including "breaking someone's head wide open" and to hitting a
hospital technician,' ° which he illustrated by "swinging his fists like a
fighter" and uttering child-like "pows." Upon the jury's finding that
he was mentally retarded and dangerous, Tyars was "committed to the
Department of Health for placement in a state hospital."' 2
On appeal, Tyars contended that the trial court committed a re-
versible error in denying his right to the privilege against self-incrimi-
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6500 (West Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
no mentally retarded person may be committed to the State Department of Devel-
opment Services. . . unless he is a danger to himself or others. . . . At any judi-
cial proceeding under the provisions of this article, allegations that a person is
mentally retarded and a danger to himself or to others shall be presented by the
district attorney ....
8. 23 Cal. 3d at 135, 588 P.2d at 795, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
9. The "interpreter," a technician from Patton State Hospital where Tyars had lived
since 1971, was also the prosecutor's main witness against Tyars on the issue of his danger-
ousness. Frequently, the questions posed were not restated to Tyars, and the "interpreter"
answered those questions himself. When Tyars was allowed to respond, the "interpreter"
changed many of Tyars' understandable words in restating the answer. Id at 143, 588 P.2d
at 800, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
10. Id at 136, 588 P.2d at 796, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
11. Id at 143, 588 P.2d at 800, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id at 137, 588 P.2d at 796, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
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nation, a violation of due process under the United States and
California Constitutions. 3 The court of appeal agreed and held that,
when loss of liberty will result, mentally retarded persons may assert
their right to silence.
In affirming the trial court and vacating the appellate court deci-
sion, the California Supreme Court concluded that an involuntary
commitment hearing is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, 14
thereby precluding application of the right not to be called as a wit-
ness." The court held that Tyars had the absolute right to refuse to
offer testimony about criminal conduct, but he could not refuse either
to serve as a witness or to testify about his relevant mental condition.
16
Thus, the court ruled that the trial court had erred in denying Tyars the
right to silence in matters that might be criminally incriminating.'
7
Nevertheless, due to the overwhelming evidence of mental retardation
and dangerousness from other sources, the error was considered harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, and the California Supreme Court up-
held the trial court's commitment.' 8 Two justices dissented.' 9
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Civil-Criminal Distinction.: Form Over Substance
Although unwarranted prejudices against mentally retarded per-
sons are deeply instilled in American society,2" the trend in federal and
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in part: "No person ... shall be compelled, in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law .... CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 uses virtually the same lan-
guage.
14. 23 Cal. 3d at 137, 588 P.2d at 796, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 656. The court reasoned that
because the commitment was limited to one year and because the petitioner could have been
someone other than a public prosecutor, Tyars' trial should be classified as a civil proceed-
ing.
15. The absolute right to refuse to take the witness stand applies only to criminal de-
fendants. See note 13 supra. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 930 (West 1966) ("To the extent
that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Califor-
nia, a defendant in a criminal case has a privilege not to be called as a witness and not to
testify.").
16. 23 Cal. 3d at 137, 588 P.2d at 796, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
17. Id at 138-39, 588 P.2d at 797-98, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657-58.
18. Id
19. The two dissenting justices were Chief Justice Bird, id at 142, 588-P.2d at 800, 151
Cal. Rptr. at 660, and Justice Newman, id at 150, 588 P.2d at 805, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
20. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, CHANGING PAT-
TERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (President's Committee
on Mental Retardation) (rev. ed. 1976) mentions seven different perceptions of the mentally
retarded person. The retarded person may be perceived as (1) sick, (2) a subhuman organ-
ism who should be "broken or tamed like horses or wild beasts," (3) an object of pity, (4) a
1980]
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state civil commitment case law has been to increase the procedural
safeguards afforded to subjects of these proceedings. In In re Gault,2'
the United States Supreme Court held that the adjudication of a juve-.
nile offender "must measure up to the essentials of due process" re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment.22 Gault involved the
commitment of a youth as a juvenile delinquent because he allegedly
made lewd telephone calls. The Supreme Court held that the availabil-
ity of the privilege against self-incrimination, usually limited to crimi-
nal defendants, must be afforded to juveniles in a commitment
proceeding,23 even though a juvenile commitment is technically civil.
The Court stated that "the availability of the privilege [against self-
incrimination] does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its
protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement of admis-
sion and the exposure which it invites."' 4 According to the Gault
Court, labels defining the civil-criminal distinction are largely superfi-
cial and based on convenience.25
Virtually all types of commitment proceedings, from juvenile de-
linquency and conservatorship hearings to those involving narcotic ad-
dicts and mentally disordered sex offenders, are labeled "civil," yet
their common result is the deprivation of liberty for rehabilitative pur-
poses, 6 thereby warranting due process scrutiny. Thus, in a line of
cases based on the Gault analysis, defendants of these civil proceedings
have been afforded many constitutional protections traditionally re-
served solely for criminal defendants. These include right to counsel,
right to jury trial and unanimous verdict, right to notice, and right to be
heard.27
special person of God, (5) a burden of charity, (6) a menace, and (7) a developing individual.
Id at 36-45.
21. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Id at 30-31.
23. Id at 49.
24. Id The Court further stated that "[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege
against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children." Id at
47.
25. Id at 49-50. See generally Comment, Arkansas Civil Involuntary Commitment.- In
the Rear Guard ofthe Due Process Revolution, 32 ARK. L. REv. 294 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as ACIC].
26. See Note, A New Emancipation: Toward an End to Involuntary Commitments, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1334, 1343 (1973).
27. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (in a juvenile justice case, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt specifically included among Gault's "essentials of due process"); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (due process required procedural safeguards for a mentally
disordered sex offender); In re Balay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of mental illness and dangerousness required in an involuntary civil commitment
proceeding); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel extends to
Vol. 14
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Traditionally, an evaluation of the extent of the protections af-
forded by the due process clause involves a balancing of the individ-
ual's interest in liberty against the state's interest in commitment.28
The primary question is whether the ultimate interest of the individual
falls within the due process clause.29 This, in turn, involves a two-part
analysis. First, if the final decision will result in a deprivation of the
individual's liberty,3" such as incarceration,3 ' the proceeding is consid-
ered to be criminal in nature. This allows for the exercise of constitu-
tional rights normally available only to criminal defendants. Second, a
determination is made whether the individual being committed for
treatment will be looked upon with societal opprobrium 32 equal to that
resulting from a criminal conviction. Thus, the interest of the individ-
all significant stages of commitment process); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (right to a judicial hearing and to be committed only upon "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing proof").
28. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 390. See generally Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d at
396.
29. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31. See ACIC, supra note 25, at 307. See generally Note,
Developments in The Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,
1271 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. In exploring the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, the United States Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1963),
concluded that the same standards must exist vis-A-vis the application of the fifth amend-
ment in both state and federal courts.
30. In discussing deprivation of liberty, Justice Fortas in Gault wrote that commitment
"is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil'." 387 U.S. at 50.
Accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66. See Developments, supra note 29, at 1194-96. See
generally Note, Mental Health and Human Rights: Report of the Task Panel on Legal and
Ethical Issues, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 49, 117 (1978).
31. One author, referring to civil commitment, simply stated that "confinement in an
institution for total care is a massive restriction on one's ability to wander the streets and do
what one will." Strauss, Due Process in Civil Commitment and Elsewhere, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 442,448 (M. Kindred ed. 1978). See Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
32. Developments, supra note 29, at 1200.
[A] former mental patient may suffer from the social opprobrium which attaches to
treatment for mental illness and which may have more severe consequences than
do formally imposed disabilities. Many people have an "irrational fear of the
mentally ill." The former mental patient is likely to be treated with disgust and
even loathing; he may be socially ostracized and victimized by employment and
educational discrimination.
Id As suggested by another commentator, "Medical illnesses, while unfortunate, are not
commonly perjorative. Psychiatric diagnoses, on the contrary, carry with them personal,
legal and social stigmas." Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 379, 385 (1973). This article monitored the commitment of eight volunteers as "pa-
tients" including three psychologists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, and a housewife. When
admitted, these actors displayed symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, although they re-
turned to normal behavior once inside the institution. Upon their release (hospitalization
ranged from 7-52 days), each was diagnosed as "schizophrenia in remission" rather than
"normal or cured."
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
ual is examined in detail by comparing, for example, the effect of a
delinquency hearing on a delinquent with that of a criminal trial on a
criminal.33
The individual's interest in liberty must then be balanced with the
state's interest in confinement.34 Even though a state may have a legiti-
mate reason for confining an individual, the denial of An individual's
liberty must be justified by a compelling state interest.35 Historically,
the state's interest is two-fold. Under the parens patriae theory, the
state has the responsibility of taking care of those unable to care for
themselves.36 Under its police power, the state has a duty to protect
society from dangerous people. 37 The state has the choice of emphasiz-
ing either or both of these theories. More often than not, the state's
chosen objective is best revealed in its commitment statute.38 Thus, a
33. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50.
34. "If the deprivation is found to be of such constitutional stature, courts must proceed
to the second step of the due process analysis, balancing, with respect to each procedural
protection, the magnitude of the individual interests and the importance of the procedure in
protecting them, against the countervailing state objectives." Developments, supra note 29, at
1271. See generally Legal Issues in State Mental Care. Proposalsfor Change-Civil Commit-
ment, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 75, 102 (1977). The Gault Court examined the state's
interest in commitment in the context of its parens patriae power, ie., in its duty to protect
"the property interests and the person of the child." 387 U.S. at 16.
35. Due process of law is a limitation on "the powers which the state may exercise," In
re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20, and as such has been applied to civil commitments. See In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 655-62, 667-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). More specifically, "[tihe strict scru-
tiny test requires that state intrusions into protected liberty be justified by some compelling
interest." Kirschner, Constitutional Standards/or Release of the Civilly Committed and Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 233, 243 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Constitutional Standards].
36. The Gault Court suggested that the state acts as a surrogate parent to the juvenile in
its parens patriae power. 387 U.S. at 16-17. The notion of parens patriae originally devel-
oped under English law where the sovereign was seen as the "father of the country," whose
duty it was "to promote the interests and welfare of his wards," the people. In America, this
power transferred to the state legislature, which has the duty of protecting the well-being of
its citizens. Developments, supra note 29, at 1207-08.
37. "Although dangerousness to self and dangerousness to others are frequently consid-
ered together, it is clear that they actually represent quite different state interests. Commit-
ment on account of dangerousness to others serves the police power, while commitment for
dangerousness to self partakes of theparenspatriae notion. . . " Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. at 390. See also Note, Procedural Safeguardsfor Periodic Review. A New Commitment
to Mental Patient's Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 850, 862 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Procedural
Safeguards].
38. As suggested in Developments, supra note 29, at 1300, "Three factors determine an
individual's dangerousness: (1) the likelihood that he will commit a harmful act; (2) the
magnitude of the harms likely to result from such an act; and (3) the time period within
which the act is likely to occur." Thus, the California statute reflects the state's duties flow-
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substantive analysis under the due process clause considers the poten-
tial detriment to the individual and the importance of the state interest
in requiring that deprivation.3 9 Justification for seeking to deprive a
person of his liberty is the burden of the state.40
In Tyars, the California Supreme Court did not review the record
in accordance with the above criteria, which the court had previously
applied, without hesitation, in other situations involving civil commit-
ment and incarceration.4' The civil-criminal distinction used instead
ing from its police power and parens patriae in that it provides for commitment upon the
finding that the mentally retarded person is a danger to himself or others. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6500 (West Supp. 1979), see note 7 supra.
39. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 655-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See Developments, supra note
29, at 1272-73; Constitutional Standards, supra note 35, at 243-47.
40. [T~he state. . . shall have the burden of demonstrating that the proposed com-
mitment is. . . consistent with the needs of the person to be committed. . . . This
duty of investigation and burden of persuasion derive from the general and well-
recognized principle that ". . . even though the governmental purpose be legiti-
mate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 392 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)). See
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1963).
41. In People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 310, 535 P.2d 352, 354, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 490
(1975), the California Supreme Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the
proper standard for the commitment hearing of a mentally disordered sex offender. After
rejecting the civil-criminal distinction, the Burnick court asserted that the curtailment of a
sex offender's liberty and the resulting social stigma are no less than those which result from
an adjudication in a juvenile delinquency hearing. Id at 323, 535 P.2d at 363, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 499.
After reviewing the individual interest at stake, the court then examined the state inter-
est involved. The state argued that proof by a preponderance of the evidence is an appropri-
ate burden considering the predictive nature of the proceeding. Id at 325-28, 535 P.2d at
366-67, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 500-03. The court was not persuaded by this argument and con-
cluded that the state's interest was not sufficiently compelling to justify Burnick's commit-
ment by any lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 328, 534 P.2d at 367,
121 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
In People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 352, 535 P.2d 373, 381, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 517
(1975), the California Supreme Court held that mentally disordered sex offenders should be
guaranteed the right to a unanimous jury verdict, which is not required by the California
Constitution for "civil" defendants. Because proceedings of mentally disordered sex offend-
ers are technically "civil," the trial court had denied the defendant in Feagley a unanimous
verdict. The California Supreme Court rejected the superficial civil-criminal distinction and
stated that a mentally disordered sex offender's hearing has all the trappings of a criminal
prosecution, "together with [its] worst consequences." Id at 350, 535 P.2d at 380, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 516. In discussing the state's interest, the court noted that "closer scrutiny is af-
forded a statute which affects fundamental interests. . . . In such cases the state bears the
burden of establishing. . . that the state has a compelling interest which justifies the law."
Id. at 355, 535 P.2d at 384, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (quoting In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 306,
486 P.2d 1201, 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971)).
Based on essentially the same reasoning, the court in People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630,
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by the Tyars majority clouded the central issue--deprivation of liberty
and the social stigma associated therewith. Additionally, the court did
not look at the state's interest and balance that against Tyars' individ-
ual interest. Indeed, the court could have reasonably concluded that
Tyars' need for treatment was so great that the state was required as
parens patriae to give Tyars the care he clearly needed.
Instead, as Chief Justice Bird's dissent pointed out, cases distin-
guishable in fact and result were relied upon, revealing one of the ma-
jor weaknesses of the Tyars opinion.42 The majority's reliance on
Black v. State Bar,43 for example, was misplaced. That case involved a
disciplinary proceeding against an attorney that could not have re-
sulted in incarceration. Furthermore, the attorney waived his privilege
against self-incrimination by testifying fully without objection. Tyars,
on the other hand, was faced with the threat of confinement and ob-
jected to taking the stand. The Black court specifically noted that a
disbarment proceeding was distinguishable from a juvenile justice pro-
ceeding precisely on the incarceration issue.44 Finally, in denying Ty-
ars due process protections, the court disregarded the substance of the
commitment proceeding because it was labelled "civil."
B. The Right Not To Be Called to the Witness Stand
Both the United States and California Constitutions provide that
no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a crimi-
nal case.45 This right against self-incrimination has been construed as
having two distinct elements: first, the privilege not to be called to the
witness stand and, second, the privilege not to incriminate oneself.
46
566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977), held that narcotics addiction commitment proceed-
ings were governed by the same procedural safeguards as those applied in Burnick and
Feagley. The Thomas court articulated the public's image of a heroin addict as "a self-
indulgent social parasite who caters to his uncontrolled craving for the drug at the expense
of his family and community obligations." Id at 640, 566 P.2d at 234, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
This stigma, combined with loss of liberty resulting from commitment, convinced the court
that the highest standard of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, must be the state's
burden in narcotic addiction proceedings. Id at 633, 566 P.2d at 229, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
42. 23 Cal. 3d at 148, 588 P.2d at 803, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
43. 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972).
44. Id at 688, 499 P.2d at 974, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination held applicable to the
states within the fourteenth amendment's due process clause).
46. E.g., United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999
(1978) (privileges not to take the witness stand and not to incriminate oneself are distinct);
United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 1965) ("a defendant on trial cannot be
required to take the stand to answer even the most innocuous nonincriminating inquiries").
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The first aspect of this fifth amendment right is not explicitly stated in
either the California or United States Constitutions. 7 Nor has the
United States Supreme Court directly acknowledged the fifth amend-
ment's dual existence." Nevertheless, the privilege not to be called to
the witness stand has been recognized by several federal courts4 9 as
well as the California Supreme Court50 and California Legislature.5'
In Griffin v. California,52 the United States Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment prohibits comment by prosecutors on the de-
fendant's failure to testify, stating that such comments were "a remnant
of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice.' - Indeed, fifth amend-
ment rights were created to prevent a recurrence of the horrors of the
Star Chamber, where a suspect, under the threat of incarceration, ban-
ishment, or mutilation, was coerced into responding. 4 The Griffin
Court, aware of the pressures that result from taking the witness stand,
suggested that nervousness and fear in a defendant can operate to in-
crease, rather than decrease, prejudices against him.Y5 Thus, the under-
lying rationale of both aspects of the privilege is to protect the accused
from giving evidence against himself.5 6 The defendant has the choice
of either refusing to take the witness stand or of taking the stand and
then refusing to testify.
In Tyars, the California Supreme Court failed to recognize Tyars'
right to each protection of the fifth amendment and held that Tyars was
required to be a witness. The reasons for fifth amendment protection
of criminal defendants are equally as compelling in the civil commit-
ment context. The nature of the proceeding, with its consequent loss of
47. Both constitutions instead prohibit a defendant from being compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal case. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
48. The United States Supreme Court indirectly recognized the existence of the right not
to take the witness stand in its decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The
Court held that the prosecutor's comments to the jury about the defendant's refusal to take
the witness stand increased the possibility of prejudice against the criminal defendant, thus
violating his fifth amendment rights. Id at 613-15.
49. See cases cited note 46 supra.
50. Eg., Black v. State Bar of California, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 685, 499 P.2d 968, 972-73, 103
Cal. Rptr. 288, 292-93 (1972); People v. Robinson, 61 Cal. 2d 373, 393, 392 P.2d 970, 982, 38
Cal. Rptr. 890, 902 (1964).
51. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 930 (West 1966), which provides: "To the extent that such
privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a
defendant in a criminal case has a privilege not to be called as a witness and not to testify."
52. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
53. Id at 614-15.
54. Id at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 613 (citing Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)).
56. See L. LEvY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 425-27 (1968).
1980]
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liberty and social stigma, mandates that the court reject the "civil" la-
bel and focus on the substance of the process.
Tyars was required to give testimony relevant to a determination
of his mental retardation and dangerousness, the requisite statutory ele-
ments for commitment. 57 The court equated Tyars' testimony with cer-
tain other physical evidence, such as voice or handwriting
identification, which is admissible at a criminal trial 8 The majority's
reference to the admissibility of physical evidence is misplaced, for it
focuses on a point in the hearing after which Tyars had already taken
the witness stand. The central issue, whether he should have been
called as a witness in thefirstplace, was not analyzed. Not only did the
majority superficially review the civil-criminal distinction, but they also
failed to address whether Tyars had the absolute right of a criminal
defendant to refuse to take the witness stand. If, as the majority as-
serted, the purpose of the privilege is "to assure that the criminal justice
system remains accusatorial, not inquisitorial," 9 then Tyars should
have had the right to refuse to take the witness stand.
C The Right to Refuse to Testify
Any person, witness or defendant, has the right in any proceeding,
civil or criminal, to decline to answer questions that may tend to in-
criminate him.6° The right extends to any situation in which a person
"has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."
'6 1
This federal standard reflects three basic rationales: "(1) the necessity
to maintain a responsible accusatorial system; (2) the desire to prevent
cruel and inhumane treatment of individuals by forcing them into a
'trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt'; and (3) the belief
that compelled confessions are serious invasions of personal privacy.
62
The Tyars court held that Tyars could refuse to answer questions rele-
vant to establishing his mental retardation or dangerousness only if
these questions specifically required answers concerning criminal con-
duct.63 Therefore, because Tyars could have incriminated himself, the
57. 23 Cal. 3d at 137, 588 P.2d at 796, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
58. Id at 139, 588 P.2d at 798, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
59. Id at 137-38, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
60. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
61. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
62. O'Brien, The Ffth 4mendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the Burger
Court, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26, 35 (1978).
63. The court stated: "To the extent that the necessary elements of mental retardation
and dangerousness may be established by evidence of criminal conduct, such evidence must,
in its entirey be elicitedfrom sources other than the individual who is the subject ofthe commit-
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trial court had erred in denying his right to silence. Nonetheless, the
California Supreme Court upheld Tyars' commitment because of the
overwhelming evidence of Tyars' retardation, finding the error harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.
64
The majority in Tyars did not confront the main issue: the incrim-
inating effect of Tyars' testimony. The threat of incrimination to a
criminal defendant is subsequent prosecution, which can result in con-
finement. The threat to Tyars, or any subject of involuntary commit-
ment proceedings, is also confinement in an institution. Allowing
Tyars to give testimony ultimately determinative of his mental condi-
tion is analogous to allowing a criminal defendant to give testimony of
his subjective intent in committing a crime. In either proceeding, the
testimony given establishes the necessary element of the state's burden
leading to incarceration or commitment. Therefore, to term Tyars' tes-
timony as harmless, regardless of the quantity or quality of evidence
against him, was simplistic.
1. The harmless error rule
The Tyars court used an outdated standard to determine whether
the trial court's error was harmless. The harmless error rule forbids
"reversal unless 'the court shall be of the opinion that the error com-
plained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' "65 The federal
standard for determining whether an error is harmless is derived from
Chapman v. California,66 in which the prosecutor commented exten-
sively on the defendants' failure to testify at their own trial, hoping to
imply that their silence was evidence of their guilt.67 In disapproving
the harmless error rule used by the California courts, the Chapman
Court found that, if a reasonable possibility exists that evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to a conviction,68 the error cannot be
considered harmless.
69
mentproceeding." 23 Cal. 3d at 138, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657 (emphasis ad-
ded).
64. Id. at 139, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657-58.
65. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20 (1967) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 13).
66. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
67. Id at 19.
68. Id at 23. The Court stated:
The California constitutional rule emphasizes a "miscarriage of justice," but the
California courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis, and perhaps
overemphasis, upon the courts' view of "overwhelming evidence." We prefer the
approach of this court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of
Fahy v. Connecticut ....
69. "An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury
adversely to a litigant cannot. . . be conceived of as harmless." Id at 23-24.
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Although the "reasonable possibility" standard may be somewhat
ambiguous,70 it cannot be definitively said that Tyars' testimony did
not in any way adversely influence the jury. Indeed, Justice Newman's
dissent termed the improper questioning of Tyars as "cruel and degrad-
ing" treatment.7 The court held, however, that "[gliven the weight and
nature of the uncontradicted evidence. . . it is clear that any erroneous
questioning of the appellant was harmless beyond all reasonable
doubt."72
Moreover, the Tyars majority declined to utilize the method set
forth by the Chapman Court in examining the effect of erroneously ad-
mitted evidence. In a recent article that reviewed the need for a clear
harmless error standard, one commentator formulated two different ap-
proaches for assessing harmlessness. The first approach focuses upon
the erroneously admitted evidence (or other constitutional error) and
asks whether it could have contributed to a guilty verdict. The second
approach asks whether, once erroneously admitted evidence is ex-
cluded, overwhelming evidence in support of the jury's verdict re-
mains.73
The majority in Tyars followed the second approach, looking at
the properly admitted evidence, such as psychiatric testimony, and con-
cluded that it overwhelmingly supported Tyars' commitment] 4 The
dissent in Tyars, however, utilized the approach of the Chapman Court
and examined whether the improperly admitted evidence had contrib-
uted to Tyars' commitment .7  The dissent stated that Tyars' testimony
of assaults that established his dangerousness and his "child like dra-
matizations, ' 76 which established his mental retardation, could not
have been more harmful.
70. See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in
Need of a Rationale, 125 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 15, 32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Field]
("tihe case law on the content of the harmless error standard is less than lucid"); Note,
Harmless ConstitutionalError: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814, 815 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as A Reappraisal].
71. Citing article five of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Justice Newman
stated that "courts should countenance neither witting nor unwitting attempts by prosecutors
to exploit possible 'freak show' prejudices." 23 Cal. 3d at 151, 588 P.2d at 805, 151 Cal.
Rptr. at 665 (Newman, J., dissenting).
72. Id at 139, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
73. Field, supra note 70, at 16. It should be noted that a third approach was suggested
by Field, but since it is not represented in the present case, it will not be reviewed.
74. 23 Cal. 3d at 139, 588 P.2d at 797-98, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
75. Id at 150, 588 P.2d at 805, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id
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2. Disapproval of the overwhelming evidence standard
In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court held that Califor-
nia's harmless error rule violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments
of the United States Constitution.77 Although the California courts
have since attempted to neutralize this harsh rule by adopting a stan-
dard of "overwhelming evidence,"78 they have been strongly criti-
cized.79 First, it has been suggested that the courts use the standard in
order to avoid their primary function and the more difficult determina-
tion of whether a constitutional error has been committed. 0 Second, a
court using this standard usurps the jury's function by denying the jury
the opportunity to decide upon what body of evidence it will convict
the defendant,8 thereby increasing the scope of the appellate court's
inquiry. Application of this standard acknowledges that evidence was
admitted incorrectly and that it affected the verdict. But, the duty of a
reviewing court is to "examine whether the trial was an essentially fair
one, in which the conviction was not based upon any constitutional
error."
82
Thus, in adopting this standard, the Tyars majority evaded its duty
as a reviewing court; it did not examine whether or not the commit-
ment hearing was fair. The acceptance of erroneously admitted testi-
mony ostensibly justified by "other ovewhelming evidence" is
tantamount to saying that it is permissible to imprison a criminal de-
fendant, even though procedural rules were violated, because he was
clearly guilty.
The overwhelming evidence on which the majority based its con-
clusion consisted of testimony from two medical examiners who diag-
nosed Tyars' condition as mental retardation encephalopathy caused
77. 386 U.S. at 21.
78. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 197, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 740 (1965)
(prosecution for murder, robbery and kidnapping); People v. Gant, 252 Cal. App. 2d 101,
118, 60 Cal. Rptr. 154, 165 (1967) (prosecution for conspiracy to commit burglary); People v.
Elliott, 241 Cal. App. 2d 659, 668, 50 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (1966) (prosecution for pimping
and pandering); People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App. 2d 621, 631, 49 Cal. Rptr. 892, 899 (1966)
(prosecution for conspiracy and wiretapping); People v. Boyden, 237 Cal. App. 2d 695, 699-
700, 47 Cal. Rptr. 136, 139 (1965) (prosecution for armed robbery); People v. De Leon, 236
Cal. App. 2d 530, 539, 46 Cal. Rptr. 241, 247 (1965) (prosecution for burglary and several
felonious acts).
79. The Chapman Court specifically disapproved the use of this standard. 386 U.S. at
23. See.4 Reappraisal, supra note 70, at 816; Note, Applications ofthe Harmless Error Doc-
trine to Violations of Miranda: The California Experience, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 941, 950-54
(1971) [hereinafter cited as California Experience].
80. Field, supra note 70, at 36. See also California Experience, supra note 79.
81. See,4 Reappraisal, supra note 70, at 819; Field, supra note 70, at 33-34.
82. Field, supra note 70, at 35.
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by post natal injury. 3 Additionally, a psychiatric technician testified as
to Tyars' assaultive behavior at Patton State Hospital.84 Yet, as men-
tioned in Chief Justice Bird's dissent, one of the physicians had inter-
viewed Tyars for only thirty minutes while the other had only
administered intelligence quotient testsA5
Furthermore, severe problems exist with psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness. 86 It has been suggested that psychiatric determinations
of dangerousness are unreliable because of their inability to correctly
predict future actions and, therefore, should be excluded from the
courtroom. 7 Commentators suggest that the technical difficulties en-
countered when discussing dangerousness seriously undermine the ac-
curacy of this type of testimony.8 The psychiatrist's personal interests
83. 23 Cal. 3d at 139, 588 P.2d at 795-96, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
84. Id The reader should recall that the psychiatric technician was the interpreter as-
signed to Tyars during his testimony. See note 9 supra.
85. id at 143, 588 P.2d at 800, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
86. This has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
87. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise. Fipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 694-96 (1974). The authors stated:
Although the specific reasons why psychiatric judgments and predictions are unre-
liable and invalid are varied, many of them can be grouped under six broad and
occasionally overlapping headings: 1) orientation and training [psychiatrists are
trained in medical school, as are all doctors, to suspect illness], 2) context [diagno-
sis is influenced by the setting in which the subject is observed], 3) time [patient
-inconsistencies from day to day], 4) class and culture [influence of the socio-eco-
nomic background of the physician], 5) personal bias [the clinician's own biases,
values, etc.], and 6) inadequacies of the diagnostic system and ambiguity of psychi-
atric data [inconsistency of clinicians' perceptions].
Id at 720.
88. These difficulties in discussing dangerousness begin with the vagueness of the con-
cept. "[E]very prediction of dangerousness involves not only the question of the magnitude
of the harm, but also questions of the likelihood, imminence and frequency of the predicted
behavior." Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness.-
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1087 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Cocozza & Steadman]. The concept of dangerousness is usually expressed through the state
statutory scheme. If the intent of the statute is preventive detention, then a simple prediction
of dangerousness will suffice. If the goal is treatment, however, usually the statute requires a
recent overt act to predict future dangerousness. Procedural Safeguards, supra note 37, at
856-57.
Furthermore, the actual occurrence of dangerous behavior among mental patients is
low, making it more difficult to accurately predict its occurrence in the future. Hartman &
Allison, Predicting Dangerousness, 1979 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 131, 133 [hereinafter cited as
Hartman & Allison]. In addition, psychiatrists tend to favor treatment, practicing preventive
medicine if any question of potential danger remains. Procedural Safeguards, supra note 37,
at 854. This may be because the socio-political consequences resulting from erroneous over-
prediction are relatively few as compared to those resulting from a mistaken underpredic-
tion. Hartman & Allison, supra, at 133-34.
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may influence the testimony. 9 It follows, then, that the extent to which
psychiatric testimony can be the sole measure of overwhelming evi-
dence should be seriously questioned. Most importantly, psychiatrists,
like other physicians, are trained to diagnose rather than to predict.90
The legal system has placed an unfair burden on the psychiatric profes-
sion by unrealistically expecting absolute accuracy,91 when the same
degree of accuracy is demanded from no other medical specialty.
92
Even if the overwhelming evidence standard prevails, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has adopted error as the unqualified standard for
California commitments. Not only does the degree of retardation need
to be established in the courtroom to justify commitment, but also the
type of commitment needs to be explored. Tyars' right to a fair trial
was unquestionably abused in the San Bernardino courtroom. When
Tyars was called as a witness, his attorney objected. If Tyars had been
a criminal defendant, this objection would have been sustained.93 Ty-
ars was then asked by the judge whether he had been involved in any
fights. Almost any answer Tyars could have given would have been
indicative of dangerousness or his mental condition, thus proving one
element required by the state statute.94 The court should have held
that Tyars' refusal to answer was protected by the right against self-
incrimination because the answer may have provided evidence to sup-
port his commitment.
Because of Tyars' speech impediment, the trial court appointed an
interpreter for him. Yet, the majority failed to point out that the inter-
preter was also the key witness for the prosecution against Tyars.9 5 The
interpreter answered many questions himself without even repeating
them to Tyars. In addition, the interpreter's translations at times were
completely different from Tyars' partially understandable responses.
89. Pertinent to the situation in Tars, in which psychiatric testimony was the sole
source of the overwhelming evidence, it has been suggested that a private physician may
want to cover up past mistakes, a hospital psychiatrist may be influenced by feared repercus-
sions from his superiors, and consultant may not want to interfere because of professional
courtesy or apathy. Procedural Safeguards, supra note 37, at 854.
90. See Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 88, at 1091.
91. Id
92. See Slovenko, Reflections of the Criticisms of Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 25
WAYNE L. REV. 37, 52 (1978). Indeed, when a University of California staff psychiatrist
successfully predicted potential death as a future act by a particular patient, authorities paid
little heed, and the woman was killed. The psychiatrist was accused of failure to exercise
reasonable care because he did not inform the woman or her parents of the potential harm.
Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
93. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6500 (West Supp. 1979), see note 7 supra.
95. 23 Cal. 3d at 143, 588 P.2d at 800, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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Finally, Tyars' attorney never challenged his competency as a wit-
ness. A defendant's physical presence is not enough to enable him to
participate effectively in his own defense; legal presence, in terms of
comprehension of the proceedings, is also required.96 This may be at-
tributed to inadequate attorney representation which often occurs in
civil commitment hearings and which has been commented upon ex-
tensively.97 It is clear that successful litigation of a commitment pro-
ceeding turns upon the effective fulfillment of the attorney's adversarial
role.98 The California court had a duty to be aware of these potential
96. In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam), the Court sug-
gested that not only must the defendant be oriented to time and place and have some mem-
ory of events, "but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him'." See also Chang
& Araujo, Interpretersfor the Defense: Due Process/or the Non-English Speaking Defendant,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 815-16 (1975).
97. The problems contributing to inadequate representation are many, but all are exac-
erbated by the nature of the proceeding. As often happens, the attorney has no opponent
which immediately removes him from an adversarial arena. As can be expected, this is
frustrating for one who is trained to fight. Since counsel does not play the "typical advo-
cate," proceedings take on a perfunctory character due to nonexistent pressure because
"nothing" is at stake. Cohen, The Function of the 4ttorney and the Commitment f the Men-
tally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424, 448-57 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. See Note, The
Right to Counsel in Ohio Involuntary Civil Commitment, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 436, 446 (1975).
Uncertain about the client's desires because no pre-hearing conference has been held or
because the patient is unable to communicate due to medication or fright, counsel often sees
his role as merely guarding the person's procedural rights, only opposing commitment when
he has subjectively determined that his client does not need treatment. Litwack, The Role of
Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 829-
31 (1974). The attorney has no standard of success against which to measure his perform-
ance, other than his clients' "best interest." Cohen, supra, at 447. Clearly, the potential for
error in this type of situation is high. At the same time, the state has not satisfied its duty in
providing counsel. In fact, Tyars' attorney did not object to his competency as a witness,
and, therefore, the severity of error cannot be underestimated. Certainly, the "overwhelm-
ingness" of evidence and its concomitant harmlessness diminish.
98. Professor Brunetti has summarized what the role of counsel should be:
(I) [E]xplain the nature of the proceedings to the client and interview him to ascer-
tain what action he wishes to take; (2) undertake a factual investigation of the
client's background and the circumstances of the case, including interviews with
the person seeking the client's commitment, the examining physician(s) and family
members, and the examination of hospital records; (3) demand a jury trial, if avail-
able, after consultation with the client; (4) speak on behalf of the client who may be
illiterate, inarticulate, or timid; (5) employ ordinary advocacy skills such as pro-
ducing evidence, cross-examining witnesses, and guarding procedural rights; (6)
investigate alternatives to commitment; (7) prepare the client for commitment if no
other disposition can be agreed upon.
Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 29 Sw. L.J. 684, 707-08 (1975). For a comprehensive review of
what techniques counsel should use, see Cohen, supra note 97, at 450-57. Commentators
suggest two main roles commonly adopted by attorneys: that of the guardian ad litem and
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deficiencies if, in fact, they existed.
3. The physical-testimonial evidentiary distinction
Even if the court was justified in determining that Tyars' testimony
was harmless beyond all reasonable doubt, it should not have equated
Tyars' testimony to physical evidence. It is generally accepted that the
right against self-incrimination protects against the compulsion of pro-
ducing evidence that is of a testimonial nature.99 Statements that com-
municate a defendant's thoughts are included within the scope of the
fifth amendment. Real or physical evidence is not protected by this
aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination. In this context, com-
pulsory blood tests have been held to be proper, ° as have handwriting
exemplars.10 Participating in a lineup and being compelled to speak
the words of a robber have also been held not to violate the privilege. 102
In other words, making the accused a source of real or physical evi-
dence does not violate the fifth amendment.
At least one court, however, has disagreed with equating testimo-
nial evidence to physical evidence. In Thornton v. Corcoran, °103 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether petitioner had a
sixth amendment right to counsel during his pre-indictment mental ex-
amination. The court held that psychiatric testimony of the accused's
mental state could hardly be considered physical evidence since his
words were of critical importance in determining his mental condi-
tion. I°4 Similarly, the testimony of Tyars was much more than "physi-
cal" evidence. Not only did Tyars testify about specific criminal
conduct, but his actions in court, responses to questions, and his own
description of what he liked to do were all indicative of his mental
retardation. The California Supreme Court equated all of this "testi-
mony" to physical evidence and considered it admissible. Yet, the
privilege against self-incrimination should have prevented its forced
disclosure.
Alternatively, the California Supreme Court could have upheld
Tyars' commitment without equating mental testimony to physical evi-
that of the adversary. Although each has its shortcomings, the adversary is most often cho-
sen. ACIC, supra note 25, at 322.
99. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1978).
100. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
101. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967).
102. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967).
103. 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
104. Id at 699. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 134 (2d
ed. 1972).
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
dence. In exploring the purpose of calling Tyars to the witness stand
and requiring him to testify, the majority could have concluded that the
questions posed were of such a nature as to require substantively
incriminating answers that would result in a jury finding of mental re-
tardation and dangerousness." 5 In addition, the court could have in-
quired into the trial court judge's motivation in questioning Tyars
about his involvement in fights and concluded that the judge was inves-
tigating Tyars' mental understanding of the trial since evidence of vio-
lence had been admitted. 0 6  In both of these situations, the goal
parallels that of a psychiatric interview in that the judge was trying to
explore defendant's mind.
In French v. Blackburn,0 7 petitioner, who was civilly committed
and then released under the North Carolina statutory scheme, con-
tended that no statements made to a psychiatrist could be used against
him. 0 8 Using a balancing test, the district court stated: "We are of the
opinion that to apply the privilege. . . would be to destroy the valid
purposes which [the interviews] serve .... ."109 Similarly, Tpett v.
Maryland, 110 a Fourth Circuit case, involved a petitioner who, accord-
ing to the Maryland Defective Delinquents Act, was required to submit
105. In an article suggesting a constitutional framework within which issues involving
preventive confinement based on predictions of future dangerousness may be reviewed, Der-
showitz specifically discussed this issue. He stated:
The privilege [against self-incrimination] ought . . . to apply at least to answers
whose substantive content may lead the psychiatrist to recommend confinement.
The analogy to demeanor evidence leads directly to the second question of whether
the subject of a predictive proceeding may refuse to testify at his trial (as may the
defendant in a criminal prosecution), or must take the stand and invoke the privi-
lege only in response to particular questions that expose him to the risk of confine-
ment (as must a participant in a noncriminal proceeding). This question becomes
particularly important in civil commitment cases when the government calls the
'patient" to the witness stand in order to demonstrate that he is "crazy." In effect,
the patient serves as an exhibit rather than a witness, and the prosecution often
asks questions designed to provoke outbursts or expose a delusional system, rather
than to induce substantively incriminating answers.
Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Frameworkfor Constitutional Analysir, 51
TEx. L. REv. 1277, 1316 (1973).
106. One commentator, in discussing the admissibility of evidence elicited during a psy-
chiatric examination suggested: "The more logical approach [is] that such evidence is 'testi-
monial' in nature, since the mental examination attempts to discover the thought processes
of the subject, and his often previously unexpressed feelings, through the elicitation of ver-
bal and physical responses." Note, 4pplication of the Fpith Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination to the Civil Commitment Proceeding, 1973 DUKE L.J. 729, 741.
107. 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C.), af'd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979).
108. Id at 1358.
109. Id at 1359.
110. 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 355 (1972). Ttopett was more
recently approved in Dower v. Boslow, 539 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1976).
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to a psychiatric interview. Judge Sobeloff's opinion, which concurred
in part and dissented in part with the majority, stated that "the legiti-
mate objectives of the legislation would be frustrated if inmates were
permitted to refuse cooperation. Granting the inmate the right to si-
lence would in many instances thwart the personal examinations and
interviews considered indispensable."'
Although these cases do not constitute mandatory authority in
California, the Tyars majority could have patterned its reasoning on
any of these legal theories without equating testimonial evidence to
physical evidence. The court could have looked to other jurisdictions,
which have refused application of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in civil commitments because of the consequential invalidation of
the diagnostic process.
III. POTENTIAL EFFECT OF CRAMER v. TYA1RS IN CALIFORNIA
Three weeks after the Tyars decision, the California Supreme
Court decided a similar case, Conservatorship of Roulet,II2 and utilized
reasoning inconsistent with Tyars. In Roulet, the Public Guardian of
Santa Barbara County, as conservator of the person and estate of
Roulet, sought reappointment in order to commit Roulet involuntarily
to a state mental institution."I3 At trial, it was shown by medical testi-
mony that Roulet, age 59, was unable to care for her basic needs. Us-
ing a preponderance of the evidence standard, with nine out of twelve
jurors deciding, the jury found Roulet gravely disabled and reestab-
lished the conservatorship." 4 The California Supreme Court reversed,
holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury
verdict were necessary to establish grave disability and the appoint-
ment of a conservator." 5 The majority opinion, authored by Chief Jus-
tice Bird, who had dissented in Tyars,"I6 relied on People v. Burnick, '1
7
People v. Feagley,"18 and People v. Thomas" 9 and followed the balanc-
ing test set forth in Gault.2 Tyars, which preceded Roulet, was neither
111. 436 F.2d at 1162. Accord, Kiritsis v. Marion Probate Court, 381 N.E.2d 1245, 1248
(Ind. 1978); Ex rel Ellenwood, 567 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1978).
112. 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979).
113. Id at 222, 590 P.2d at 2, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
114. Id
115. Id at 235, 590 P.2d at 11, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
116. Tyars was a 5-2 decision. Roulet was a 4-3 decision with Justices Tobriner and
Mosk taking inconsistent positions.
117. 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975).
118. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
119. 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977).
120. 23 Cal. 3d at 223-33, 590 P.2d at 3-9, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 427-33.
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distinguished nor discussed. Rather, the court reestablished pre-Tyars
precedent by extending due process safeguards, such as the requisite
standard of proof 2' and unanimous jury verdict, to the area of conser-
vatorship commitments. In its concluding paragraph, the Roulet court
stated that "[t]here is no logical reason to diverge from. . . [the path of
Burnick," Feagley and Thomas] in this case. . . . Logic and law, as
well as regard for the value of liberty, compel this court to follow those
decisions today."' 2  Chief Justice Bird may have been referring to Ty-
ars when she stated that "[t]o turn back to the repudiated criterion of
the civil-criminal label serves only to exalt form over substance."'
213
121. Until the recent decision of Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), many jurisdic-
tions agreed that the benefiting party must prove that the respondent is mentally ill, but most
disagreed as to the necessary standard of proof.
The landmark case in this area was In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which held that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, required by due process in criminal trials, is equally appli-
cable to commitment hearings (in this case juvenile) in which the same fundamental rights
are threatened. This holding has been followed in many of the United States appellate and
district courts. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
In contrast, the Addinglon Court ruled that, in a petition for civil commitment, due
process "only requires proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of evidence." (em-
phasis added). The United States Supreme Court explicitly distinguished Winsho by stating
that it was a delinquency hearing, inquiring whether an individual in fact committed a crim-
inal act. Since that is the same inquiry which occurs in a criminal hearing, the same stan-
dard of proof can be used.
A civil commitment hearing, however, cannot be equated to a criminal proceeding
largely because a civil commitment revolves around the meaning of a set of facts-the psy-
chiatric interpretation of existing mental characteristics-whereas the central issue in a crim-
inal proceeding is whether the accused committed the acts. 441 U.S. at 428-30. Finally, the
Court held it impractical and unfair to require the state to carry such an onerous standard as
"beyond a reasonable doubt" stating that "there is a serious question as to whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and
likely to be dangerous." Id at 429.
The California Supreme Court could have used similar reasoning in distinguishing Ty-
ars from a criminal hearing. In Addington, civil commitment proceedings were distin-
guished from criminal proceedings, not by a label, but by the nature of the factfinders'
inquiry. The inquiry was directed to the subject's state of mind and not to the factual inves-
tigation of the accused's acts, as in the criminal counterpart. The full panoply of rights
granted by the Gault-Winship rule and its progeny now have an exception. Thus, the stan-
dard of proof used in Roulet was rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
122. 23 Cal. 3d at 235, 590 P.2d at 11, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 435. Is this the foreshadowing of
the emergence of two separate standards in two distinct proceedings? A proceeding to deter-
mine whether a person is gravely disabled (thus in need of a conservator) may be inherently
more "criminal" than a proceeding to determine whether a person is mentally retarded. In
the former, liberty is in the hands of another, the conservator. In the latter, liberty is in the
hands of the state. Future decisions will tell whether one is more of a deprivation than the
other.
123. Id
CRAMER V TYARS
Nevertheless, Tyars was completely ignored in Roulet. It may be that
the California Supreme Court views Cramer v. Tyars as an anomaly in
California case law.
This trend of expanding due process protections to subjects of civil
commitments continued in the decision of In re Watson."4 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held that Watson's fundamental constitutional
rights were violated when she was denied an opportunity to be present
at her own civil commitment hearing. No evidence was presented to
show that she was physically unable to attend or that she had waived
her personal presence. In fact, the record showed that she was standing
outside the courtroom. 2 After initially concluding that Watson's ab-
sence resulted in a "substantial loss of liberty,"' 2 6 the court analogized
the hearing to a criminal trial and asserted that "a defendant's personal
presence at trial is a condition of due process . . . [which] would be
thwarted by the absence of the accused. . . . The right to a fair hear-
ing is an essential of due process whether life, liberty or property is
being taken by criminal or civil process." '127
IV. CONCLUSION
Tyars' testimony was of questionable value to the trial court. If
overwhelming evidence in fact existed that indicated mental retarda-
tion, there was no compelling reason to violate Tyars' due process
rights by denying him both protections afforded by the fifth amend-
ment: the absolute right to refuse to take the witness stand and the
right to refuse to testify.
The initial determination that subjects of civil commitment pro-
ceedings should not be afforded criminal due process protections re-
flects a reliance on labels rather than the true nature of involuntary
commitment. An analysis of the individual's interest involved, bal-
anced against the state's interest in commitment, would have been ap-
propriate. Not only should Tyars have had the absolute right not to
124. 91 Cal. App. 3d 455, 154 Cal. Rptr. 151. (1979).
125. Id at 458, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
126. Id at 459, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
127. Id at 460-61, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56. One subsequent California appellate case
has relied on the Tyars holding. In Cramer v. Shay, 94 Cal. App. 3d 242, 156 Cal. Rptr. 303
(1979), a man who was the subject of a civil commitment was released by the court after
telling the police, four psychiatrists, his grandmother, and his cousin that he had burned two
houses and one car because he was angry. The Shay court held that, mandated by the Tyars
court, evidence of mental retardation and dangerousness established by criminal conduct
must be elicited entirely "from sources other than the individual who is the subject of the
commitment proceeding." Id at 246, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 306 (citing Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal.
3d at 138, 588 P.2d at 797, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 657).
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take the witness stand, but he also should not have been required to
testify at all, because any testimony would have contributed to the
state's case for commitment. Additionally, the court's method of as-
sessing the harmlessness of error and employing the overwhelming evi-
dence standard seems to indicate a denial of the judiciary's
responsibility of ensuring a fair trial. Finally, the confusion created by
the court is exacerbated when seen against the background of subse-
quent decisions such as Watson or Roulet, in which the California
Supreme Court ignored Tyars.
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